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Abstract
We analyze a game of two-sided private information characterized by extreme
adverse selection, and study a special case in the laboratory. Each player
has a privately known "strength" and can decide to fight or compromise.
If either chooses to fight, there is a conflict; the stronger player receives a
high payoﬀ and the weaker player receives a low payoﬀ. If both choose to
compromise, conflict is avoided and each receives an intermediate payoﬀ.
The only equilibrium in both the sequential and simultaneous versions of the
game is for players to always fight, independent of their own strength. In our
experiment, we observe among other things (i) frequent compromise, (ii) little
evidence of learning, and (iii) diﬀerent behavior between first, second and
simultaneous movers. We explore several models in an attempt to understand
the reasons underlying these anomalous choices, including quantal response
equilibrium, cognitive hierarchy, and cursed equilibrium.
JEL classification: C92, D82.
Keywords: two-sided private information, adverse selection, laboratory ex-
periment, behavioral game theory, quantal response equilibrium, cognitive
hierarchy, cursed equilibrium.
1 Introduction
One of the major insights from theoretical research in information economics
is that profitable agreements may be severely impeded by private informa-
tion, and can even dry up completely. This was nicely illustrated in Akerlof’s
(1970) famous market for lemons example and studied in further detail by
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) in a context of optimal contracting with
two-sided private information. More generally, no-trade theorems (Milgrom
and Stokey (1982), Morris (1994)) show that rational, expected utility maxi-
mizing, Bayesian economic agents will not trade with each other on the basis
of private information alone.
In this paper, we study an environment where exchange, or other mutual
agreements that have exchange-like features, is impeded for reasons of pri-
vate information. An all-too-familiar example, war, illustrates the problem.
Suppose there are two nations, either of which would be better oﬀ if con-
quering the other nation, compared to peaceful coexistence, and would be
worse oﬀ being conquered. If there is a war, whichever country is strongest
conquers the other one. The leader of each nation knows its own military
strength but knows only the probability distribution of the other nation’s
strength. Each nation chooses to either "attack" or "not attack". They re-
main in peaceful coexistence if both choose not to attack, and a war ensues
otherwise. If one formalizes this problem, the equilibrium always results in
war. This would be true, for example, even if the benefits of winning the
war were only slightly greater than the peace benefits, and the cost of los-
ing a war were enormous. The logic is much like the unravelling argument
in adverse selection games. In deciding whether to attack or not, optimal
decision making requires the agents to condition on their opponent choosing
"not attack". Because weaker opponents are the ones who do not attack, this
conditioning will lead stronger opponents to attack. Therefore, there will be
a marginal strength level which is indiﬀerent between peace and forcing a
war. But this calculus will lead the opponent’s marginal non-attackers to
attack, and so forth. The only equilibrium is for the marginal strength type
to be the weakest type. As developed in section 2.1, the same logic applies to
other situations where parties with conflicting goals and private information
can negotiate an agreement: litigations, electoral debates, firm competition,
and other situations.
We report here an experiment that explores behavior in several variations
of this two-sided asymmetric information environment in the laboratory. In
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all the variations, the equilibrium outcome is the same: fighting ensues with
probability one. We obtain several strong results. First, as predicted by
the theory, agents roughly follow an individual cutpoint rule: fight is chosen
if and only if strength is above a certain threshold. However, instead of
this threshold being at (or at least close to) the minimum strength, we find
that players generally use cutpoints in an intermediate range. As a result,
peaceful outcomes, or compromises, occur with surprisingly high frequency
— nearly 25% of the time in some sessions. Second, fight rates are aﬀected
by the treatment variables. In the sequential version and conditional on
strength, second movers are more likely to fight than first movers. Thus,
second movers anticipate that not fighting is an indicator that the first mover
had a relatively low strength. Also, in both the sequential and simultaneous
treatments, agents are less likely to fight the higher the payoﬀ under peace.
Third, these results are robust with respect to experience: there is little
evidence of learning.
We then apply several recent theories of imperfect rationality in games
to analyze the data and see if the insights from these alternative theories can
account for our findings. The three approaches we explore are equilibrium
stochastic choice, levels of strategic sophistication, and naïve beliefs. The
specification of our models for these three approaches are, respectively, the
logit specification of Quantal Response Equilibrium theory (QRE); the Pois-
son specification of the Cognitive Hierarchy model (CH); and a stochastic
choice version of Cursed Equilibrium (CE). We find that all three models
capture the main features of the data in remarkably similar ways. The esti-
mated parameters for each model are relatively constant across treatments.
However, there are some subtle diﬀerences in the predictions, that lead to
diﬀerences in the fit of the models. The QRE model captures the tendency
of the second mover to fight more often than the first mover. The CH and
CE models capture the aggregate tendency of players to fight with probabil-
ity close to one when their strength is suﬃciently high and with probability
close to zero when their strength is suﬃciently low. Not surprisingly then,
the best fit is obtained with a combination of models.
2 The theoretical model
We analyze the incentives of agents to compromise when they have conflicting
objectives and asymmetric information. To this end, we study a class of
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games that have unique Nash equilibrium outcomes in which a compromise
is never reached. We start with some concrete examples that illustrate the
conflicts we have in mind.
2.1 Some introductory examples
Consider two agents who must decide whether to split a surplus in a pre-
specified manner (compromise) or try to reap all the benefits for themselves
(no-compromise). Both agents have private but imperfect information about
their likelihood of obtaining the benefits if they do not compromise and,
possibly, its value also. The ex-post sum of utilities may be higher or lower
under compromise than under no-compromise.
A myriad of examples fit this general description, in addition to the exam-
ple of international conflict in the introduction. In a litigation, the defendant
may oﬀer a settlement to the plaintiﬀ which can be accepted or not. Both
parties have private knowledge of the strength of their case and the bias of
the jury. In an electoral campaign, each candidate can drive its rival into
a public debate. If a debate takes place, the true talent of the contenders
is revealed to voters and aﬀects their probability of winning the election. If
there is no debate, voters must rely on expected talents. In a product mar-
ket competition, firms oﬀering horizontally diﬀerentiated products may start
an R&D race. The winner captures the entire market and the probability
of winning is proportional to the privately known quality of their research
department. Alternatively, firms can avoid the race and split the market.
In all these cases, there are only two possible outcomes: settlement, peace,
no debate, no race vs. trial, war, debate, race. The first outcome needs the
agreement of both agents whereas each agent can unilaterally force the sec-
ond outcome. Payoﬀs depend on the state of the world, which is not realized
(or revealed) until after all players have acted. The total surplus of agents
may vary across outcomes: litigations and wars are typically costly whereas
electoral debates are neutral for the parties involved.1 Last, the utility of
agents under the diﬀerent outcomes may depend on the private informa-
tion parameters, but they are exogenously given. Payoﬀs under agreement
are typically determined by the status quo situation whereas payoﬀs under
no-agreement are typically determined by a winner-takes-all rule.
1We are not including the welfare of third parties such as society or voters. These are
also diﬀerent across outcomes but, in principle, they are not internalized by players.
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2.2 A formalization of the problem
We formalize the problem as follows. Denote by si ∈ Si and sj ∈ Sj the pri-
vately known “strength” of agents i and j, with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j (case
strength, military capacity, politician’s talent, research quality). These val-
ues are drawn from continuous and commonly known distributions Fi(si | sj)
possibly diﬀerent and possibly correlated. For technical convenience, we as-
sume strictly positive densities fi(si | sj) for all si and sj. Agent i chooses
action ai ∈ A = {ρ, φ}, where ρ stands for "retreat" and φ for "fight". If
a1 = a2 = ρ, there is compromise (settlement, peace, no debate, no race)
and the payoﬀ of agent i is βi(s1, s2). Otherwise, there is no-compromise
(trial, war, debate, race) and the payoﬀ of agent i is αi(s1, s2) if si > sj
and γi(s1, s2) if si < sj, with αi(s1, s2) > βi(s1, s2) > γi(s1, s2) for all
i, s1, s2. Note that, ex-post, a compromise is always beneficial for one agent
and detrimental for the other. The pair of strengths (si, sj) determines the
winner and the loser. Payoﬀs under compromise and no-compromise are
exogenously given, although they may be unknown at the time of making
the decision if they depend on (s1, s2). Last, the socially eﬃcient action
may be compromise or no-compromise or it may even be a zero-sum game:
αi(s1, s2) + γj(s1, s2) R βi(s1, s2) + βj(s1, s2) for all si > sj.
2.3 The optimal strategy
Given this structure, we can analyze the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
for the sequential version of the game. We have the following result.
Proposition 1 In all PBE of the game, the outcome is "no-compromise".
Proof. Suppose that there exist two sets S˜1 j S1 and S˜2(S˜1) j S2 such that
in a PBE of the game a1(s1) = ρ and a2(s2) = ρ with positive probability
for all s1 ∈ S˜1 and s2 ∈ S˜2(S˜1).2 Denote by s1 = max
s1∈S˜1
and s2 = max
s2∈S˜2(S˜1)
.
According to this PBE, once agent 2 has observed a1 = ρ, the following
inequality must be satisfied:
2Positive probability rather than probability 1 takes care of pure and mixed strategies




β2(s1, s2)dF1(s1 | s1 ∈ S˜1, s2) >
Z
s1∈S˜1∩s1<s2




γ2(s1, s2)dF1(s1 | s1 ∈ S˜1, s2) ∀ s2 ∈ S˜2(S˜1)
where the l.h.s. is agent 2’s expected payoﬀ if a2 = ρ and the r.h.s. is his
expected payoﬀ if a2 = φ. This condition must hold in particular for s2 = s2.
Since α2(s1, s2) > β2(s1, s2) > γ2(s1, s2), the inequality necessarily implies
that s1 < s2 must be binding at least for some s1 ∈ S˜1. Therefore, s2 < s1.
Now, agent 1’s decision is relevant only if a2 = ρ. Thus, for the strategy
described above to be a PBE, the following inequality must also hold:Z
s2∈S˜2(S˜1)
β2(s1, s2)dF2(s2 | s1) >
Z
s2∈S˜2(S˜1)∩s2<s1




γ1(s1, s2)dF2(s2 | s1) ∀ s1 ∈ S˜1
Using the same reasoning as before, s1 < s2. Since both inequalities cannot
be satisfied at the same time, S˜1 6= ∅ and S˜2(S˜1) 6= ∅ cannot both occur in
equilibrium. ¤
The intuition is simple. In this class of games, agents know that infor-
mation which is positive for them is negative for their rival. Thus, they have
opposite interests on when to reach a compromise. As a result, whenever
one agent wants to compromise, the other should not want to. For instance,
country 1 has an incentive to stay in peaceful coexistence whenever its mil-
itary strength s1 is low. However, this is precisely when country 2 wants to
force a war. In other words, in these games, one agent’s gain is always the
other agent’s loss (of same or diﬀerent magnitude, it does not matter). Since
a compromise is broken as soon as one agent does not find it profitable, the
fact that an agent wants to deal implies that the other should not accept
it, and viceversa. The bottom line is that, in equilibrium, compromises are
never possible. We want to stress the generality of this result, which holds
for any distribution of strengths (the same or diﬀerent for both players) and
any correlation between the players’ strengths. Since the results holds for
any payoﬀs satisfying αi > βi > γi, it means that introducing risk-aversion
would not change the outcome of the game either. The result can be further
extended as follows.
Corollary 1 The outcome of the game is still "no-compromise" if agents
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play the same stage game repeatedly and if agents announce their strategy
simultaneously.
Applying the same logic as before, repetition will not change the outcome
of the game. Consider a two-stage version. If the second stage is reached,
agents will update their beliefs about the type of their rival. However, since
the no-compromise result does not depend on the functional form of the dis-
tribution of types, this revision of beliefs will not help reaching a compromise.
Anticipating no-compromise in the second stage, parties will not compromise
in the first stage either, for exactly the same reasons as in Proposition 1.
As for the simultaneous case, the only diﬀerence with the sequential game
is that agent 2 will not compare his options conditional on having observed
the choice of agent 1. However, it does not make any diﬀerence since, both
in the sequential and the simultaneous versions, his action is only relevant
if agent 1 oﬀers a compromise. Thus the outcome of the Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (BNE) is, just like for the PBE, always no-compromise.
3 Laboratory experiment
3.1 Description of the game
This is a simplified version of the game described earlier. Each agent indepen-
dently draws a number from a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and privately
observes their own number, which we refer to as the player’s strength, si.
Agent 1 chooses whether to "fight", φ, or "retreat", ρ. If 1 chooses φ, then
the game ends. The agent with highest strength receives a win payoﬀ H
and the other agent receives a lose payoﬀ L (< H). If agent 1 chooses ρ,
then it is agent 2’s turn. If agent 2 chooses φ, then as before, the agent
with highest strength receives a payoﬀ of H and the other receives a payoﬀ
of L. If, instead, agent 2 also chooses ρ, then agent 1 and agent 2 each ob-
tains a pre-specified "compromise payoﬀ" M , where L < M < H. Thus, the
main simplification relative to the theoretical model presented in section 2
is that the win, lose and compromise payoﬀs are all independent of (s1, s2).
Each player’s strength only aﬀects payoﬀs vía the likelihood of winning under
no-compromise. We look at several variations on this game.3
3The nominal payoﬀs in the experiment are: H = 95, L = 5,M ∈ {50, 40}. We present
here the scaled version (x− 5)/90.
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Variant 1. H = 1, L = 0, M = .50 with sequential move.
Variant 2. H = 1, L = 0, M = .39 with sequential move.
Variant 3. H = 1, L = 0, M = .50 with simultaneous move.
Variant 4. H = 1, L = 0, M = .39 with simultaneous move.
3.2 Relation to the experimental literature
We are not aware of any laboratory experiments of sequential games with
two-sided private information. However, our setting shares several features
with some well-known games. Below we describe (from most to least similar)
two simultaneous games of multi-sided asymmetric information, two sequen-
tial games of one-sided asymmetric information and one static game of full
information.
The betting game (Sonsino et al. (2001), Sovic (2004), Camerer et al.
(2006)). An asset yielding a fixed surplus can be traded between agents who
have private information. Trade occurs only if both agents agree. As in
our game, all the BNE imply no trade. There are three main diﬀerences.
First, the risky outcome requires agreement in the betting game whereas
the safe outcome requires agreement in the compromise game. Second, the
information structure is simpler in the betting than in the compromise game:
in 2 out of the 4 possible states, one agent has full information. The common
knowledge of this information partition triggers very naturally unravelling to
no-trade. This special partition is likely to facilitate learning. Third, a
sequential version of the betting game has never been studied.
Auction of a common value good and the winner’s curse (Kagel and Levin,
2002). As in our game, agents will play suboptimally if they do not antic-
ipate the information contained in the rival’s action. Our game allows for
some simple comparative statics (diﬀerent timings and diﬀerent compromise
payoﬀs). Also, our BNE and PBE are simple to compute. Again, we expect
more rapid learning in the auction game. A bidder who does not realize the
winner’s curse and shades his bid accordingly is likely to win, lose money,
realize his mistake, and learn for the next round.
Adverse selection game (Akerlof, 1970). The seller has a privately known
valuation θ. The buyer has a valuation function B(θ) > θ but only knows the
distribution from which θ is drawn. The buyer proposes a price and the seller
accepts or refuses. As in our model, this game predicts some unravelling.
However, the robust conclusion is the existence of a cutoﬀ below which there
is agreement or trade and above which there is not. This cutoﬀ can be the
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lower bound (i.e., never agree as in our game), but it can also be the upper
bound (i.e., always agree) or an interior value, depending on the parameters
of the game. Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) show that the probability
that buyers engage in unfavorable trades is increasing in the complexity of
the adverse selection game. Note that because it is one-sided asymmetric
information, the buyer’s action has no signaling value. There have also been
several market experiments with informed sellers and asymmetric information
about product quality (Lynch et al., 1984).
Blind bidding game (Forsythe et al., 1989). This experiment asks a quite
diﬀerent question: will an informed seller reveal the quality of his good to
the uninformed buyers? Full revelation occurs because the seller with the
highest quality good has always an incentive to announce it, then so does
the seller with second highest quality good, and so on. However, there is no
role for the key eﬀect of our game, namely the anticipation of information
conveyed by the rival’s action.
Beauty contest (Nagel, 1995). As our game, it predicts unravelling inde-
pendently of the specific parameters of the problem. Since it is a static game
of complete information, the reasons for convergence are diﬀerent. Note also
that even the most naïve learning rule (‘play optimally given the outcome in
the past round and assuming that nobody else revises his strategy’) predicts
rapid convergence if the game is played repeatedly. The experimental data
confirms this prediction.
3.3 Experimental design and procedures
We conduced five sessions with a total of 56 subjects, using a simple 2 × 2
design. The subjects were registered Princeton students who were recruited
by email solicitation, and all sessions were conducted at The Princeton Lab-
oratory for Experimental Social Science. All interaction in a session was
computerized, using an extension of the open source software package, Mul-
tistage Games.4 No subject participated in more than one session. The two
dimensions of treatment variation were the compromise payoﬀ (M = .50 vs.
M = .39) and the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential play). In each
session, subjects made decisions over 40 rounds, with M fixed throughout
the session. Half of the subjects participated in sessions with M = .39, and
4Documentation and instructions for downloading the software can be found at
http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu.
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half the subjects participated in sessions withM = .50. In all sessions, we set
H = 1 and L = 0. Each subject played exactly one game with one opponent
in each round, with random rematching after each round. At the beginning
of each round, t, each subject was independently assigned a new strength,
sit, drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].5 Each subject observed his
own strength, but had to make the fight-retreat decision before observing the
strength of the subject they were matched with. The opponent’s strength
was revealed only at the end of the round.
At the beginning of each session, instructions were read by the experi-
menter standing on a stage in the front of the experiment room, which fully
explained the rules, information structure, and client GUI for the simulta-
neous move game. A sample copy of the instructions is in the Appendix.
After the instructions were finished, two practice rounds were conducted, for
which subjects received no payment. After the practice rounds, there was an
interactive computerized comprehension quiz that all subjects had to answer
correctly before proceeding to the paid rounds. For the first 20 paid rounds
of a session, subjects played the simultaneous version of the game. At the
end of round 20, there was a brief instruction period during which rules for
the sequential version of the game were explained.6 In each match of the
sequential version, one of the two players was randomly selected to be the
first mover. After the first mover made a fight-retreat choice, the second
mover was informed of that choice, but was not informed of the strength of
the first mover. If the first mover’s choice was fight, the second mover had
no choice, and simply clicked a button on the screen labeled "continue". If
the first mover’s choice was retreat, the second mover had a choice between
fight and retreat. After the second mover made a choice, the match ended
and the strength levels and outcome were revealed. The subjects then par-
ticipated in 20 additional rounds of the sequential version of the game, with
opponents, roles (first or second mover), and strengths randomly reassigned
at the beginning of each round. Subjects were paid the sum of their earn-
ings over all 40 paid rounds, in cash, in private, immediately following the
session. Sessions averaged one hour in length, and subject earnings averaged
$25. Table 1 displays the pertinent details of the five sessions.
5In the experimental implementation of payoﬀs, the H and L payoﬀs paid oﬀ $.57 and
$.03, respectively. The compromise payoﬀ M was scaled accordingly, at $.30 and $.24 for
the two treatments.
6In one of the sessions, the sequential version was played in rounds 1 − 20 and the
simultaneous version was played in rounds 21− 40.
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Session # subjects M rounds 1-20 rounds 21-40
1 8 .50 sequential simultaneous
2 8 .50 simultaneous sequential
3 12 .50 simultaneous sequential
4 14 .39 simultaneous sequential
5 14 .39 simultaneous sequential
Table 1. Session details for the experiment.
4 A descriptive analysis of the results
In this section, we provide a descriptive analysis of the experimental results.
We discuss the main aggregate features of the data, including the mean
rates of fight and retreat, both overall and as a function of strength, and
explore time trends. We compare the data to two natural benchmarks. The
first benchmark is Nash equilibrium, in which all players always choose φ
regardless of strength (and, in the sequential version, regardless of the choice
of the first mover). A second, weaker benchmark is the type-independent
model, where the probability of fighting is independent of strength. We study
the diﬀerences in probabilities of fighting as a function of the compromise
payoﬀ and the timing of the game. Last, we analyze the data at an individual
level. For each player, we estimate a decision rule that maps strength into a
probability of fighting.
4.1 Aggregate fight rates unconditional on strength
The simplest cut at the data is to compare the relative frequencies of choosing
ρ or φ, without conditioning on the actual draws of si. Table 2 shows the
relative frequencies of φ in the experiment, broken down by compromise
payoﬀ and order of moves. The number of subjects is in parenthesis.
Order Role M = .39 M = .50
Sequential First .589 (280) .538 (264)
Sequential Second .643 (115) .566 (122)
Simultaneous – .657 (560) .573 (560)
Table 2. Unconditional frequency of choosing φ.
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There are several interesting comparisons. First, for all roles, there is a
diﬀerence in the simultaneous treatment and for both roles in the sequential
treatment between φ rates in the M = .39 and the M = .50 treatments.
Fighting is chosen less frequently when the "compromise dividend" is higher.
The diﬀerences are fairly small in magnitude and significant at the 5% level
only for the simultaneous treatment.7 Second, there is a small, but not
significant diﬀerence between the φ rates for the first and second movers in
both theM = .39 and theM = .50 treatments: first movers in the sequential
game choose φ less frequently than second movers and also less frequently
than players of the simultaneous game. Third, second movers also choose φ
somewhat less frequently than players in the simultaneous games, in both the
M = .39 and the M = .50 treatments, but the diﬀerences are insignificant.
The logic of the game suggests that, over time, learning will lead to
unravelling. That is, perceptive players should be able to realize that they
will improve their payoﬀ by adopting a cutoﬀ strategy lower than the cutoﬀ
strategy used by their opponent. Given the symmetry of the game, they
should realize that perceptive opponents will also notice this. The unravelling
logic may be responsible for the higher fighting rates of second relative to
first movers. It also suggests that φ rates should be increasing over time,
in all treatments. We investigate this hypothesis by breaking the data down
into early and late matches. In each session, there were 20 rounds each of the
sequential and the simultaneous games. We code the choices in the first 10
rounds of each version of the game as "inexperienced" and the last 10 rounds
of each version as "experienced". Table 3 presents the φ rates, broken down
by experience level. The number of subjects is in parenthesis.
Order Role M = .39 M = .50
inexper. exper. inexper. exper.
Sequential First .564 (140) .614 (140) .484 (124) .586 (140)
Sequential Second .672 (61) .611 (54) .484 (64) .655 (58)
Simultaneous – .611 (280) .704 (280) .582 (280) .564 (280)
Table 3. Unconditional frequency of choosing φ by experience level.
The eﬀects of experience on the unconditional φ rates is ambiguous. In four
of the six comparisons, the φ rate increases, as hypothesized, although it
7The diﬀerence is significant at the 1% level in the sequential treatment if the two roles
are pooled.
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remains well below 1. All four such diﬀerences are statistically significant.
In two of the six comparisons, φ decreases, but these two changes are not
significant. Furthermore, the two treatments where φ decreases have no
apparent relation with each other (simultaneous with M = .50 and second
player in sequential withM = .39). Some possible explanations for this very
weak of evidence for learning are discussed later in the paper.
4.2 Aggregate fight rates conditional on strength
The analysis above, while providing a useful sketch of the results, falls short of
giving a complete picture of the aggregate data, because the unconditional
φ rates are not a suﬃcient statistic for the actual strategies. A behavior
strategy in each game is a probability of choosing φ conditional on s. By
aggregating across all the (strength, action) paired observations for a treat-
ment, we can graphically display the aggregate empirical behavior strategy,
and then compare this strategy across treatments. Figure 1 shows six graphs.
The graphs on the left correspond to M = .39, and the graphs on the right
are forM = .50. The middle and bottom graphs are for the first and second
movers in the sequential treatment, and the top graphs for the simultaneous
movers. The strength is on the horizontal axis, on a scale of 0 to 100, and
the empirical fighting frequencies are on the vertical axis on a scale of 0 to
1. Thus, for example, if all subjects were to choose the same cutoﬀ strat-
egy s∗, then we would observe a step function, with a probability of fighting
equal to 0 below s∗ and equal to 1 above s∗. Note that functions need not
be monotonically increasing, although we expect that players with higher
strength will be more likely to fight. The empirical fighting frequencies are
moving averages over 5 strength levels.
[Figure 1 here]
These graphs suggest that the second-movers in the sequential version of
the game behave diﬀerently in at least two ways. First, they tend to fight
more. If one looks at the point in the graph where the fight probabilities first
reach 50%, this switchpoint is in the high 20s for second movers in both the
.39 and .50 treatments, while it is in the mid to high 30s for simultaneous
movers and even higher for the first movers in the sequential treatment.
The second movers also display less erratic behavior, in the sense that for
low values they (almost) never fight and for high values they (almost) always
fight. This is reflected in a steeper response curve.
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This latter observation begs for an explanation. Since the decision of a
player matters only if the rival chooses ρ, players should condition their action
on that event, rendering irrelevant their position in the game (first, second
or simultaneous mover). The increased fighting and less erratic behavior
of second movers suggests instead that players find it easier to respond to
observed than to anticipated choices of the rival. This relates to the findings
on the winner’s curse where bidders have a diﬃcult time in conditioning the
bid on the information conveyed by their winning the auction.
4.3 Individual cutpoint analysis
In order to address the question of conditional fight rates more carefully, we
turn to an analysis of individual choice behavior. Do subjects adopt cutpoint
decision rules? If so, how much variation is there across individuals? How
do cutpoints vary across treatments? We document that indeed nearly all
subjects use (approximate) cutpoint strategies, there is some heterogeneity
across subjects, and the distribution of these strategies varies systematically
across treatments.
In order to estimate decision rules, we use a simple optimal classification
procedure, similar to Casella et al. (2006) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996).
For each subject and each condition the subject is in, we look at the set of
strengths they were randomly assigned, and the corresponding fight/retreat
decision they made. For any hypothetical cutpoint strategy for an individual
subject, we can then ask how many of these decisions are correctly classified.
For example, if in some round a subject with strength 40 chose φ, the deci-
sion would be correctly classified only if the hypothetical cutpoint were less
than or equal to 40. We then use the hypothetical cutpoint with the fewest
misclassified decisions as the estimate for that individual/condition.8 Table 4
reports the average estimated cutpoint across all subjects, and the percent-
age of misclassified decisions, by condition. The average cutpoints mirror
the aggregate fight rates by condition reported in Table 2. The most fighting
occurs in .39 treatments, and there is more fighting (and fewer "errors") by
second movers than first movers.
8If there are multiple best fitting cutpoints, we take the average.
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Condition M average estimated % misclassified empirical
cutpoint optimum
Simultaneous .39 36.7 3.4 17
Simultaneous .50 45.5 3.7 26
First Mover .39 40.2 2.1 15
First Mover .50 45.1 2.3 18
Second Mover .39 37.0 0.0 18
Second Mover .50 40.7 0.8 26
Table 4. Cutpoint summary statistics.
Overall, very few decisions are misclassified. In each of the simultaneous
treatments, 16 out of 28 subjects are perfectly classified. In the sequential
conditions, the number of perfectly classified subjects range from 23 to 28 out
of 28. The worst case of misclassification was one subject in the simultaneous,
.50 treatment who has 5 misclassified observations. Our inference from this
is that subjects use cutpoint strategies, with rare exceptions.
The next question is whether subjects are using the same cutpoints, or if
instead there is a significant amount of heterogeneity. Indeed, we find quite a
bit of heterogeneity. Figure 2 displays the cumulative frequency distribution
of estimated cutpoints for all the treatments. The horizontal axis represents
hypothetical cutpoints, ranging from 0 to 100. The vertical axis indicates
how many subjects (out of 28) were estimated to have been using a cutpoint
less than or equal to that number.
[Figure 2 here]
So, for example, in the simultaneous,M = .39 treatment, the distribution
of estimated cutpoints is approximately Uniform between 20 and 50. Graphs
of the distribution of cutpoints in other conditions also exhibit a wide range
of estimated cutpoints, with few above 60 or below 20.
One can compare the distribution of cutpoints used by players in the
game to the cutpoint that would be optimal, given the actual frequencies of
fighting in the experiment. These "empirically optimal" cutpoints are given
in the last column of Table 4. The optimal cutpoints are generally about
one-half time the corresponding median estimated cutpoints.
As this significant amount of heterogeneity suggests, many but not all
players are "fooled" by this game. We find that 20% of the estimated cut-
points are within 5 units of strength of the optimal cutpoint. Of the remain-
ing estimated cutpoints, 7% are less than the optimal cutpoint by at least 5
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strength units, and 73% are greater than the optimal cutpoint by at least 5
units.
4.4 Summary of descriptive analysis
The main findings of our analysis so far can be summarized as follows. First,
the unconditional φ rates range from about 50% to 70%, depending on the
treatment, falling far short of the theoretical prediction of 100%. Second,
in all treatments, the φ rate conditional on strength increases monotonically
from virtually 0% for strengths below 20% to virtually 100% for strengths
above 60% if M = .39 or above 70% if M = .50. Third, comparative sta-
tics with respect to M has the expected sign, with less fighting when the
compromise payoﬀ is higher. Fourth, second movers display more fighting
and less erratic behavior than first and simultaneous movers. This suggests
the importance of actually observing the behavior of the rival before mak-
ing inferences and choices, rather than just conditioning on a hypothetical
event. Fifth, there is little evidence of learning: unconditional fight rates
increase significantly over time in 4 out of 6 conditions but decrease in the
other 2 conditions. A possible explanation is the insuﬃcient feedback pro-
vided to players (only the rival’s strength and the outcome is revealed at the
end of each round). However, given that the order of moves matters, one
would expect that second movers would use their knowledge of unravelling
when they subsequently play first.9 Sixth, the vast majority of subjects use
cutpoint strategies. This shows their understanding, at least at an intuitive
level, that the expected payoﬀ diﬀerential between φ and ρ increases with the
player’s strength. Seventh, there is substantial heterogeneity in the players’
cutpoints, and the distribution of these cutpoints varies by condition in ways
that mirror the diﬀerences in the aggregate fight rates.
5 Competing models to explain the data
In this section, we consider several models to explain the excessively low fight
rates. Note that this game is easily solved by iterated dominance, but only
9Recall that in our design, all players gain experience as both first and second movers.
That is, our data on first and second movers are all coming from the same subjects.
Subjects apparently do not draw inferences from their own decision making in diﬀerent
roles about how other subjects behave in those roles.
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using weak rather than strict dominance. Denote a strategy as a function
q : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. First note that any strategy q that assigns q(1) < 1 is
weakly dominated by the strategy q0 where q0(s) = q(s) for all s 6= 1 and
q0(1) = 1. In the experiments, the type distribution was discrete, so once we
eliminate all those strategies, then any strategy q that assigns q(.99) < 1 and
q(1) = 1 is weakly dominated by the strategy q0 where q0(s) = q(s) for all
s 6= .99 and q0(.99) = 1. And so forth.10 On the other hand, rationalizability
does not eliminate any strategy, since every strategy is a weak best response
to the equilibrium strategy, q∗(s) = 1 for all s.
The three models we consider all have features that admit the possibility
of observing weakly dominated strategies. The first such model is quantal
response equilibrium or QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995); the second is
cognitive hierarchy or CH (Camerer et al., 2004); and the third is cursed equi-
librium or CE (Eyster and Rabin, 2005).11 We also consider some variations
of these models that allow for heterogeneity or hybridize between models,
such as the truncated quantal response equilibrium or TQRE (Camerer et
al., 2006).
5.1 Quantal Response Equilibrium
Quantal response equilibrium applies stochastic choice theory to strategic
games, and is motivated by the idea that a decision maker may take a sub-
optimal action, and the probability of doing so is increasing in the expected
payoﬀ of the action. In a regular QRE (Goeree et al., 2005), one simply
replaces the best response function used to characterize Nash equilibrium,
with a quantal response function that is continuous and monotone in ex-
pected payoﬀs. That is, the probability of choosing a strategy is a contin-
uous increasing function of the expected payoﬀ of using that strategy, and
strategies with higher payoﬀs are used with higher probability than strategies
with lower payoﬀs. A quantal response equilibrium is then a fixed point of
the quantal response mapping. In a logit equilibrium, for any two strategies,
the log odds of the choice probabilities are proportional to the diﬀerence in
10For theM = .50 game, at the last iteration, a player with the lowest strength, s = .01,
is indiﬀerent between φ and ρ, and therefore, there is an equilibrium with s = .01 types
choosing ρ and all other types choosing φ. For the M = .39 game, the iteration continues
all the way down, and the only equilibrium is q∗(s) = 1 for all s.
11Some preliminary findings about CH and CE are discussed in Wang (2006), with
permission of the authors.
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expected payoﬀs, where the proportionality factor, λ, is a measure of respon-










where σij is the probability i chooses strategy j and Uij is the corresponding
expected payoﬀ in equilibrium. Note that a higher λ reflects a "more precise"
response to the payoﬀ diﬀerential. The polar cases λ = 0 and λ → +∞
correspond to random choice and Nash equilibrium, respectively.
Given this stochastic choice model, it is natural to first ask how costly
are suboptimal strategies in the compromise game. There is no absolute
answer to this question, since best responses depend on the strategy of the
opponent, but the following analysis indicates that the expected costs of
suboptimal behavior are quite small.
Expected losses from suboptimal cutpoint strategies. Suppose that
player 1 plays a (suboptimal) cutpoint strategy s˜1 ∈ (0, 1) and player 2 best
responds to that strategy. If a1 = ρ, agent 2’s expected payoﬀ of playing
a2 = ρ and a2 = φ are, respectively, M and Pr[s2 > s1 | s1 < s˜1]H +Pr[s2 <
s1 | s1 < s˜1]L. One can immediately see that there is a cutoﬀ s˜2 < s˜1 such
that a2(s2) = φ if s2 ≥ s˜2 and a2(s2) = ρ if s2 < s˜2. Under a uniform
distribution, H = 1 and L = 0, we have s˜2 = Ms˜1. Let Vi(s˜1, s˜2) be agent







































In the Nash equilibrium, s˜1 = s˜2 = 0 so Vi = 1/2: both players win with
equal ex-ante probability. If, instead, player 1 plays a naïve strategy s˜1 = 1/2
and player 2 best responds to this, his ex-ante loss is about 6% of his expected
payoﬀ if M = .50 and 8% if M = .39, two relatively small numbers. Also,
the computations are made under the assumption that player 2 perfectly
anticipates player 1’s strategy. Therefore, these numbers provide an upper
bound in the expected cost of playing suboptimally. Last, it is interesting
to notice that if the compromise payoﬀ is suﬃciently high (M ≥ .67), then
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Vi(s˜1,Ms˜1) > Vi(0, 0) for all i, s˜1 > 0. That is, both agents benefit if one of
them does not play the optimal strategy even if this deviation is anticipated
by the rival.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the expected cost of using a suboptimal
cutpoint strategy is likely to be small. This is confirmed by the data. Using
the empirical choice frequencies in the experiment, we calculated the expected
payoﬀs from diﬀerent cutpoint strategies. Indeed these are rather flat, as
illustrated in Figure 3, which graphs these payoﬀs for the simultaneous,M =
.50 treatment (the other treatments have similar results and thus are not
reported here). This result may partly explain why there is so little evidence
of learning in the experiment.
[ Insert Figure 3 ]
Specification of the QRE model. We consider two diﬀerent specifica-
tions of the logit equilibrium version of QRE. The first specification takes
an interim approach and analyzes the game in behavioral strategies. This
approach corresponds to the agent QRE (AQRE) of McKelvey and Palfrey
(1998). Conditional on player 1’s strength, and given the AQRE behavioral
strategies used by player 2, the log-odds of player 1 choosing retreat vs. fight
is proportional to the diﬀerence in expected payoﬀs between retreat and fight
— and similarly for player 2.
The second analyzes the game in ex ante strategies, and assumes play-
ers choose stochastically over possible plans for whether or not to fight as a
function of strength.12 Because the set of all possible pure strategies in our
game is huge (2100), we are forced to consider only a subset of such strategies.
The natural restriction is to consider only monotone strategies, i.e., cutpoint
strategies. This is a natural restriction since monotone strategies are always
best responses and furthermore any non-monotone strategy is weakly domi-
nated by a monotone strategy. This also reduces the set of pure strategies to
a small enough number (100) that estimation is possible. The above analysis
about the expected cost of using suboptimal cutpoints is especially relevant
for this cutpoint QRE approach.
In the logit parameterization of the cutpoint QRE, the distribution over
cutpoint strategies used by player 2 has the standard property. Namely, the
log-odds of player 1 choosing any cutpoint c versus any other cutpoint c0
12A similar approach is taken in the ex ante QRE model explored in Casella et al. (2006).
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is proportional to the ex ante diﬀerence in expected payoﬀs between using
those two cutpoints — and similarly for player 2.
Logit QRE in behavioral strategies. For any response parameter λ
we solve for a fixed point in behavioral strategies. Denote by φ∗λ such an
equilibrium fixed point, and by φ∗λ(s) the equilibrium probability of φ given
s.
Consider first the simultaneous game. We need to determine the expected
utility of φ for a player with strength s conditional on the other player using
strategy φ∗λ and having chosen ρ. This is simply equal to the conditional
probability that the other player has strength less than s, given that he has








The expected utility of ρ conditional on the other player having chosen ρ is





















for all s ∈ [0, 1]
The sequential game requires solving simultaneously for φ∗λ1(s1) and φ
∗
λ2(s2).
The expressions for the first mover are exactly the same as in the simultane-
ous move game, so, modifying the notation slightly to make clear that it is
















The condition for the second mover is the same, except the second mover’s
expected utility diﬀerence does not have to be conditioned on the first mover















Logit QRE in cutpoint strategies. We next consider the slightly more
sophisticated version of QRE where players are assumed to randomize over
monotone cutpoint strategies, which we call QRE-cut. In our game, a cut-
point strategy is a critical value of strength, c, such that player i chooses φ if
si ≥ c and chooses ρ if si < c. Hence, we define a cutpoint quantal response to
be given by two probability distributions over c, one for each player, denoted
q1(c) and q2(c). In the simultaneous version of the game, we consider only
symmetric QRE-cut where q1(c) = q2(c) = q(c) for all c. For the sequential
version, generally q1(c) 6= q2(c) since it is not a symmetric game, and the
second player chooses a cutpoint after observing the first player’s move. We
use the logit quantal response function for a parametric specification. Hence,
the probability that a player chooses a particular strategy is proportional to
the exponentiated expected payoﬀ from using that strategy, given the cut-
point quantal response function of the other player. It is worth noting that
past studies have found that in binary choice games with continuous types,
a cutpoint strategy can be a useful variation on the standard QRE approach
(see Casella et al., 2006). Furthermore, the analysis in section 4.3 suggests
that subjects seem to adhere to this type of strategies.
Consider the simultaneous game. The expected utility to player 1 of using















The first term is the probability of drawing a strength s above the cutpoint,
in which case player 1 chooses φ and obtains a payoﬀ 1 only if player 2 has
a lower strength. The second term is the probability of drawing a strength
s below the cutpoint, in which case player 1 chooses ρ. Then, if player 2’s
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strength is lower, a compromise gives payoﬀ M and a no-compromise gives
payoﬀ 1, and if player 2’s strength is higher then a compromise gives payoﬀ





for all c˜ ∈ [0, 1]
In the sequential game, the expression for the first mover’s utility of using















By contrast, the second mover’s utility of using c˜, given player 1 uses q1(·)
















ds2 + c˜M (4)
There are three observations to make about the cutpoint QRE solutions.
First, in the sequential game, the equilibrium cutpoint distributions are dif-
ferent for the two players. The second mover generally adopts lower cut-
points, which translates into higher φ rates in the figures. Second, players
adopt lower cutpoints whenM is lower. Third, the cutpoint distributions for
the first mover in the sequential games are diﬀerent from the cutpoint dis-
tributions in the corresponding simultaneous games, even though the utility
formulas (equations 2 and 3) are identical.
We fit the behavioral strategy logit QRE and the cutpoint strategy QRE
models by standard maximum likelihood techniques, i.e., finding the value
of λ that maximizes likelihood of the observed frequencies of strategies. We
estimated restricted and unrestricted versions of the models. In the most
restricted version, the parameters are constrained to be the same across all
treatments. We also estimate a version of the model where the parameters
are constrained to be the same for the .39 and .50 treatments, but are allowed
to be diﬀerent in the simultaneous and sequential games.
5.2 Cognitive Hierarchy
The CH model (Camerer et al., 2004) postulates that when a player makes a
choice, his decision process corresponds to a "level of sophistication" k with
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probability pk. The CH solution to a game is uniquely determined by an as-
sumption about how level 0 types behave (σ0), and the distribution of levels
of sophistication (p).13 Once the behavior of level 0 players is determined,
level 1 players are characterized by choosing with equal probability all strate-
gies that are best responses to level 0 opponents. Level 2 players optimize
assuming they face a distribution of level 0 and level 1 players, where the
distribution satisfies truncated rational expectations. That is, the beliefs of
level 2 players that their opponent is choosing according to a level 0 or a level
1 decision process, denoted b2(0) and b2(1), is given by the truncated "true"
distribution of these types: b2(0) = p0p0+p1 and b
2(1) = p1p0+p1 . Level 2 play-
ers are then characterized by choosing with equal probability all strategies
that are best responses to b2 beliefs about the opponents. Higher levels are




For any distribution of levels, p, this implies a unique specification of a
mixed strategy for each level, σ(p) = (σ0(p), ..., σk(p), ...), and this spec-
ification can be solved recursively, starting with the lowest types. This
generates predictions about the aggregate distribution of actions, denoted
σ(p) =
P∞
k=0 pkσk(p). In all applications to date, p is assumed to be Poisson
distributed with mean τ . That is, pk = τ
k
k! e
−τ . We consider two specifications
of the behavior of level 0 types.
Random actions. In the standard CH model, level 0 players are typically
assumed to choose an action randomly. In the context of our game, this
means that they are equally likely to select φ or ρ, independently of their
strength. Level 1 types best respond to level 0 types. It can be easily shown
that the best response strategy is to choose cutpoint M . Level 2 players
then optimize with a cutpoint somewhere between M (the best response if
everyone is level 0) and M2 (the best response if everyone is level 1), with
the exact value depending on p0 and p1. Behavior by higher level players is
defined recursively.
13The CH model is an extension of the original level-k model of Nagel (1995). See Stahl
and Wilson (1995), Crawford and Iriberri (2005), Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), and
Camerer et al. (2006) for further examples of estimation of level-k models, based on
experimental data.
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Random cutpoints. An alternative version, which we call the cutpoint
CH model, replaces the assumption that level 0 types randomize uniformly
over actions, with the assumption that they randomize uniformly over cut-
point strategies. This implicitly endows level 0 types with some amount
of rationality, in the form of monotone behavior: they are more likely to
choose φ when their strength is high than when their strength is low. In
our game, a level 0 type who randomizes over cutpoints has a probability of
φ as a function of s which is equal to s. As in the standard CH, the best
responses of higher types will be unique cutpoints, and are easily calculated
by recursion. Since a level 0 type has a probability 1− s of choosing ρ, the
posterior distribution of strength of a level 0 type conditional on choosing ρ
is f(s | ρ) = 1−sU 1
0 (1−x)dx
= 2 − 2s. Hence, the expected payoﬀ of φ for a level




(2−2x)dx = 2s−s2. Since the payoﬀ of ρ isM , the optimal
cutpoint of a level 1 type is the value sM1 that solves 2sM1 − (sM1 )2 =M , that
is sM1 = 1−
√
1−M . For our two treatments, we get s.501 = 1−
p
1/2 ≈ .29
and s.391 = 1 −
p
11/18 ≈ .22. Higher types are then defined recursively,
with the exact cutpoint for a level k depending on {pl}k−1l=0 . This produces
a CH model that is comparable to QRE in the sense that all players choose
cutpoint strategies, so φ probabilities are monotone in s for all players.
We fit the Poisson specification of the CH and cutpoint CH models to
the dataset by finding the value of τ that maximizes likelihood of the ob-
served aggregate frequencies of strategies, under the assumption that types
are identically and independently distributed draws. We estimated the best-
fitting values of τ by maximum likelihood for each of the four treatments,
and report both constrained and unconstrained estimates.
5.3 Combining quantal response and strategic hierar-
chies (TQRE)
The predictions of the CH model (both with random actions and random
cutpoints) diﬀer from the QRE and QRE-cut models in two important ways.
First, in CH, all players with the same level of sophistication choose the
same cutpoint strategy. Second, predictions in CH are identical for the se-
quential and simultaneous versions of the game.14 Neither "bunching" by
14If we assume that level 0 types are not random players but just confused by the
diﬃculty of the game, then it could be argued that a level 0 second mover can infer some
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layers of reasoning nor identical behavior in the simultaneous and sequential
treatments are observed in the data.
An approach that combines QRE and hierarchical thinking, called Trun-
cated Quantal Response Equilibrium (TQRE), is developed in Camerer et al.
(2006). This model introduces a countable number of players’ skill levels,
λ0, λ1, ..., λk, ... . The distribution of skill levels in the population is given by
p0, p1, ..., pk, ... . A player with skill level k chooses stochastically with a logit
quantal response function with precision λk. TQRE assumes truncated ratio-
nal expectations in a similar manner to CH, so that a player with precision
λk has beliefs pkj = pj/
Pk−1
l=0 pl for j < k and p
k
j = 0 for j ≥ k. For reasons of
parsimony and comparability to CH, we assume that skill levels are Poisson
distributed and equally space λk = γk. Thus, it is a two parameter model
with Poisson parameter, τ , and a spacing parameter, γ.
The TQREmodel has two eﬀects. It smoothes out the mass points, and it
makes diﬀerent predictions for the sequential and simultaneous games. These
eﬀects work slightly diﬀerently with behavioral strategies and with cutpoint
strategies, so we consider both versions.
5.4 Cursed Equilibrium
In a CE model, players are assumed to systematically underestimate the
correlation between the opponents’ action and information. As in the CH
model, a cursed equilibrium will be the same in both the sequential and
simultaneous treatments. In an α-cursed equilibrium (CEα) all players are
α-cursed. However, players believe that opponents are α-cursed with prob-
ability (1 − α) and they believe that actions of opponents are independent
of their information with probability α. All players optimize with respect
to this (incorrect) mutually held belief about the joint distribution of op-
ponents’ actions and information. In our model, we can easily compute the
cutpoint strategy in CEα as a function of M , denoted s∗α(M). For a player
with strength si, and assuming the other player is using s∗α(M), the expected
utility of φ, conditional on the opponent choosing ρ is given by:
V αφ (si) = αPr{sj < si}+ (1− α) Pr{sj < si | aj = ρ, s∗α(M)}
= αsi + (1− α)min{1, sis∗α(M)}
information about how to play only by observing the action of the first mover. This would
imply diﬀerent choices for first and second movers in CH. However, the method to obtain
those diﬀerences seems somewhat ad-hoc. We therefore decided not to explore this route.
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A player with strength equal to the equilibrium cutpoint must be indiﬀerent
between φ and ρ. Formally, V αφ (s
∗
α(M)) = V αρ (s∗α(M)). Therefore:15
s∗α(M) =
(
1− 1−Mα if α > 1−M
0 if α ≤ 1−M
A diﬃculty with the CEα model is that it cannot be fit to the data due
to a zero-likelihood problem: for each value of α it makes a point prediction.
Therefore, we slightly modify the equilibrium concept in order to allow for
stochastic choice. The approach we follow is to combine QRE with CEα.16 In
the simultaneous move game, a (symmetric) α-QRE is a behavior strategy,
or a set of probabilities of choosing φ, one for each value of s ∈ [0, 1]. We
denote such a strategy evaluated at a specific strength value by φ(s). Given
λ and α we denote by α-QRE the behavior strategy φ∗λα. If player j is using
φ∗λα and player i is α-cursed, then i’s expected payoﬀ from choosing φ when
si = s is given by:




























And the expected payoﬀ from choosing ρ is:










Using the logit specification for the quantal response function, we then apply
logit choice probabilities to the diﬀerence in the expected payoﬀ from φ and
15In a fully cursed equilibrium (α = 1), all players choose strategies as if there is no
correlation between the opponent’s action and information. Thus, they all behave like a
level 1 player in CH with random actions: s∗1(M) =M .
16Note that player heterogeneity with respect to α will imply heterogeneity of cutpoints
but it will still not solve the zero-likelihood problem: for any cursedness α ∈ [0, 1], it is
always true that s∗α(M) ≤M . However, in our data set, we have many observations where
players with strength s > M choose ρ.
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ρ for each si = s. By inspection of V αφ (s) and V
α

















for all s ∈ [0, 1]
which can be solved numerically, for any value of α.
In the sequential version of the game, we need to simultaneously solve
for the first and second movers, φ∗λα1 and φ
∗
λα2, respectively. The expected
payoﬀ equations under φ and ρ for the first mover are the same as in the
simultaneous move game, so we have:
V αφ1(s1) = αs1
Z 1
0











V αρ1(s1) = αs1
Z 1
0







However, the expressions for the second mover are diﬀerent, because expected
payoﬀs are conditional on the observation that the first mover chose ρ:






V αρ2(s2) = M

























[1 − φ∗λα2(s2)]ds2. Since this factor is smaller than 1, it means that
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the payoﬀ diﬀerences to player 2 are magnified relative to player 1, which, in
equilibrium, will result in φ∗λα2 having higher slope and lower mean compared












for all s2 ∈ [0, 1]
One can fit the logit version of the α-QRE model to the dataset by finding
the values of λ and α that maximize likelihood of the observed frequencies of
strategies. We estimated the best-fitting values by maximum likelihood for
all four treatments and display the results in Table 5.
5.5 Model estimates
In this section we compare how well the diﬀerent models fit the data, and
explore the stability of the estimated parameters across the diﬀerent treat-
ments. We estimate the free parameters of all the models described in the pre-
vious section, for the treatments separately, pooling across theM-treatments
and pooling across all treatments. For the QRE, CH and TQRE models, we
consider both the behavioral strategy version and the cutpoint version. In
all three models, the cutpoint version fit the data better than the behavioral
strategy version in every single treatment and in all the pooled estimations.
This is not surprising, given our earlier finding that most subjects exhibit
choice behavior that is consistent with a cutpoint strategy. We therefore
report in Table 5 only the results for the cutpoint versions of these models.
We also refer only to these models in the discussion below.
QRE-cut CH-cut TQRE-cut α-QRE
N λ -lnL τ -lnL γ τ -lnL λ α -lnL
Sim .39 560 20.8 171.0 0.6 183.2 4.4 5.0 170.5 26.6 0.92 145.5
Sim .50 560 11.3 213.6 0.3 211.7 449.0 0.4 210.3 18.4 0.77 202.9
Sim All 1120 16.2 387.8 0.5 397.4 6.9 2.7 386.3 21.3 0.85 355.6
Seq .39 395 11.5 125.0 0.4 137.1 6.0 2.4 124.6 23.5 0.97 102.0
Seq .50 386 9.3 140.5 0.5 137.9 142.0 0.5 136.6 15.8 0.75 138.2
Seq All 781 10.4 265.3 0.4 275.1 8.0 1.8 263.5 18.4 0.86 248.9
All 1901 13.0 656.8 0.5 672.6 10.0 1.8 651.2 20.1 0.85 605.9
Table 5. Model estimates.
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There is substantial variation in the quality of fit across the diﬀerent
models. The better fitting models all converge to 0% for low strengths and
to 100% for high strengths. The α-QRE model, which generally fits the best
of all these models, does not have cutpoints built into it explicitly, but boils
down to a "soft" cutpoint model; that is, α-QRE choice probabilities follow
a logit function that equals .5 at an implicit cutpoint. Figure 4 displays the
empirical and fitted φ-probabilities as a function of strength. The empirical
frequencies are aggregated into bins of 5 units of strength (1-5, 6-10, etc.)
along the horizontal axis, with φ-probabilities in the vertical axis. Fitted
choice frequencies in the figure are based on out-of sample17 parameter es-
timates for the cutpoint models and the α-QRE model. All these models
capture the upward sloping empirical frequency of φ. All exhibit low φ rates
for low strengths and high φ rates for high strengths.
[ Insert Figure 4 ]
The CH-cut and QRE-cut models fit the data equally well, in spite of
major diﬀerences in the predicted fight curves. In the CH-cut model, level
0 players randomize over cutpoints, which implicitly endows level 0 players
with a degree of rationality in the form of increasing fight probabilities. This
model predicts quite well the very low fighting rates for strengths below 20%.
QRE-cut does a poorer job for strengths in that regions and yet it generally
fits better than CH-cut. This can be attributed to the fact that QRE-cut
predicts that second movers will have sharper response functions than first
movers, which is a feature of the data not captured by CH. TQRE-cut does
not provide a substantial improvement over QRE-cut or CH-cut. In fact,
the fitted φ-rate for TQRE-cut and QRE-cut are very similar. They both
share the problem of overestimating the fighting rates for subjects with low
strength. The α-QRE is the best fitting of all models, as it combines the
elements of cursedness and stochastic choice. The pure cursed equilibrium
predicts the steepest response of fighting probability as a function of strength.
In fact, all players follow the same cutpoint strategy, which is a function of
α, the players’ degree of cursedness.18 Adding quantal response, produces
a nice logit function of the fighting probability, that crosses .50 at s ≈ .40
17The displayed curves for the sequential treatments are constructed using the parameter
estimates obtained from the pooled simultaneous data, and vice versa.
18This contrasts with the CH model where players with diﬀerent levels of thinking follow
diﬀerent cutpoint strategies.
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and which is consistent with the data. Furthermore, quantal response also
introduces a steeper φ curve for the second movers than for the first movers,
which is again consistent with the data.
There are some diﬀerences in fit between the .39 and the .50 treatments,
with most models fitting the data from the .39 treatment better. It is hard to
say exactly why this is the case, except to note that the empirical φ curves
are steeper in the .39 data. There is virtually no diﬀerence in either the
fit or the actual parameter estimates for the sequential and simultaneous
treatments. The α-QRE pooled estimates of λ and α are not significantly
diﬀerent between the two treatments, even at the 5% level, and the fit is
identical (log Likelihood/N=-.318 in both cases).
5.6 Summary of estimation results
The main findings about the specific models we estimated are summarized
as follows. First, all models capture the most basic qualitative properties
of behavior: fight rates are increasing in s and decreasing in M . Second,
estimates are similar acrossM treatments, and little power is lost by pooling
treatments. Third, models based on QRE capture the fact that first movers
behave diﬀerently from second movers. In particular, the φ function is steeper
for second movers. Models based on CH and CE capture the low fighting
rates of players with strength below 20%. Fourth, the cutpoint versions of
CH and QRE describe behavior better than the behavior strategy versions.
This is not surprising, given the findings at the individual level that indicate
widespread use of cutpoint strategies by our subjects. Fifth, TQRE-cut
provides an almost identical fit than QRE-cut, suggesting that, in this game,
the addition of hierarchical thinking to quantal response does not have a
substantial impact. Last, the α-QRE model fits best. The estimates of α are
virtually identical for both the sequential and simultaneous games.
6 Conclusions
The compromise game is obviously very challenging to the cognitive abilities
of players. This is true not only for our subjects but even for experienced
microeconomists. In our experiment, players seem to understand some basic
elements of the game, such as the cutpoint nature of the optimal strategy.
However, they have problems figuring out the full logic of the unravelling
29
argument. It is also important to realize that the game has some unusual
properties: each player’s action is relevant only if the rival does not play
optimally, and the Nash equilibrium strategy is a best response only to the
rival playing also the Nash equilibrium.
We conclude with some final comments. First, this paper only explores
a few possible explanations for the surprising behavior we observed in these
games of incomplete information. There are several other alternative ap-
proaches that might be interesting to explore as future research. One can-
didate would be the "analogy-based expectation equilibrium" developed by
Jehiel and Koessler (2006) for games with private information. Another pos-
sibility is to follow the social preference approach, which hypothesizes that
models based on selfish preferences are mis-specified. However, it is not
clear exactly what such models of pro-social behavior (fairness, reciprocity,
or altruism) would imply in the present context. For instance, if we adopt
the fairness formulation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the payoﬀs of winning,
compromising and losing become 1 − β, M , and −α respectively. Thus, if
fairness considerations are suﬃciently strong (β ≥ 1−M) agents always play
ρ. Otherwise, agents want to set a lower cutpoint than their rival and the
equilibrium again unravels to playing always φ. Our subjects do not exhibit
such extreme behavior. Reciprocity is also unlikely to account for the ob-
served choices. The second movers fight more than the first movers. This
means that observing ρ increases rather decreases the willingness to recipro-
cate by responding also with ρ. Overall, the major problem with this game
seems to be the high level of cognitive ability required to play optimally.
Of course, the detailed implications of pro-social models are more compli-
cated, once they are combined with stochastic choice behavior, which would
be necessary for a careful evaluation of their statistical fit to the data.
A second direction to extend the models is to explicitly allow for hetero-
geneity in the data. While the CH model is suggestive of heterogeneity, the
attempts here an elsewhere to fit the model assumes homogeneity, since re-
peated observations of the same individual are treated as independent draws
from the type space. In principle, one could extend the CH models to allow
for fixed types. Similarly, the QRE and α-QRE models could be extended
to allow for heterogeneity with respect to λ and α, also with fixed types.
One of the most interesting findings is that the order of moves aﬀects
choices in this game. While we found one possible explanation for this
phenomenon (QRE), there are probably other explanations that could be
formalized, and we believe understanding this phenomenon more deeply con-
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stitutes an interesting challenge for future research. Indeed, a player’s action
is relevant only if the rival chooses ρ. Thus, first, second and simultaneous
movers should all condition their strategy on that event. By contrast, the
data shows that players who observe ρ being played by their rival (second
movers) respond more aggressively than players who must condition on the
anticipation of that event (first movers). Even among subjects who do not
observe the choice of the rival before playing, there is a diﬀerence between
knowing that one’s choices will be publicly observed before the rival makes
his choice (first movers) and knowing that one’s choices will not be observed
(simultaneous movers). Hypothetical conditioning on events seems to pro-
duce diﬀerent behavior than observational conditioning on events. Naturally,
this has implications for many other strategic settings, including common
value auctions and voting behavior, where optimal choice requires voters to
condition on being pivotal.19
Last, we tried to give the equilibrium model a good shot at succeeding, by
including a treatment where M < .50. In that treatment, fighting is ex ante
fair and ex ante eﬃcient. While subjects did respond to lower compromise
payoﬀs by choosing higher φ-rates, the increase was very slight. We conjec-
ture that one would have to set very lowMs in order to observe fighting rates
close to the theoretical predictions. We also conjecture that ρ-rates would
increase if compromising was the socially eﬃcient outcome (M > .50). This
adds an interesting dimension to the problem since, as discussed in section
4.3, when M > .67 both players can benefit when one of them is boundedly
rational and the other is aware of the cognitive limitations of his rival.
19See, for example, Dekel and Piccione (2000) who show that, under some conditions,
every symmetric equilibrium outcome of a simultaneous voting game with information
aggregation is an equilibrium outcome of the sequential version of the game.
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Appendix: Sample Instruction Script
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research experiment on group decision
making. During the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention. So we
ask that you follow these instructions carefully. You may not open other applications on
your computer, chat with other students, or engage in other distracting activities, such as
using your cell phones or head phones, reading books, etc.
For your participation, you will be paid in cash, at the end of the experiment. Diﬀerent
participants may earn diﬀerent amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions,
partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. So it is important that you listen
carefully, and fully understand the instructions before we begin. You will be asked some
review questions after the instructions, which have to be answered correctly before we can
begin the paid session.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction
between you will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk
or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the experiment except
according to the rules described in the instructions.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you will
be given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the
computers. If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and
your question will be answered out loud so everyone can hear. If any diﬃculties arise after
the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you
privately.
This experiment will begin with a brief practice session to help familiarize you with
the rules. The practice session will be followed by a paid session. You will not be paid for
the practice session.
This paid session of the experiment has 2 parts. In each part you will make choices
over a sequence of 20 diﬀerent decision rounds so in total you will make 40 decisions. In
each round, you will receive a payoﬀ, that depends on your decision that round and on
the decision of one randomly selected participant you are matched with. We will explain
exactly how these payoﬀs are computed in a minute.
At the end of the paid session, you will be paid the sum of what you have earned in all
40 decision rounds, plus the show-up fee of $10.00. Everyone will be paid in private and
you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings during
the experiment are denominated in POINTS. Your DOLLAR earnings are determined
by multiplying your earnings in POINTS by a conversion rate. In this experiment, the
conversion rate is 0.006, meaning that 100 POINTS equals 60 cents.
Here is how each decision round, or match, works. First, the computer randomly
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matches you into pairs. Since there are 14? (note to reader: depends on session) partic-
ipants in today’s session, there will be 7? (note to reader: depends on session) matched
pairs in each decision round. You are not told the identity of the participant you are
matched with. Your payoﬀ depends only on your decision and the decision of the one
participant you are matched with. What happens in the other pairs has no eﬀect on your
payoﬀ and vice versa. Your decisions are not revealed to participants in the other pairs.
Next, the computer randomly assigns a number to you, which is equally likely to be any
number between 1 and 100. This number is called your “strength.” Each strength number
is chosen independently for each participant. Therefore usually you and the person you
are matched with will have diﬀerent numbers, although there is a very small (1%) chance
the other participant in your pair has the same strength you have. You are told your
strength, but will not be told the strength of the other participant until after you have
made your decision.
You then have to make a decision to take one of two possible actions. These two
actions are called “fight” and “retreat”. If both of you choose retreat, then both of you
will receive a payoﬀ of 40 points each. However, if either of you chooses fight, then the
one with the greater strength receives a 95 points payoﬀ and the one with less strength
receives a 5 points payoﬀ. Ties are broken randomly.
[SCREEN 1] This slide shows a summary of the Payoﬀs
Each of you must make your decision to fight or retreat at the same time, so neither
of you are told what the other participant chose (or their strength) until after both of you
have made your choices. The match is over when you and the person you are matched
with have both made a decision, and the computer will show you the results of your match
only.
When all pairs have finished the match and seen the results, we proceed to the next
match. For the next match, the computer randomly reassigns all participants to a new
pair, and randomly reassigns a new strength to each participant. Your new strength
assignment does not depend in any way on the past decisions or strengths of any participant
including yourself. Strength assignments are completely independent across pairs, across
participants, and across matches. After learning your new strength assignment, you choose
either “fight” or “retreat” and receive payoﬀs in a similar manner as in the previous match.
This continues for 20 matches, at which point Part 1 of the experiment is over. I will
read you the instructions for Part 2 after we complete Part 1.
We will now begin the Practice session and go through two practice rounds. During
the practice matches, please do not hit any keys until you are asked to, and when you
enter information, please do exactly as asked. Remember, you are not paid for these 2
practice rounds. At the end of the second practice round you will have to answer some




Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says “c”. When the computer
prompts you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and
wait for further instructions.
[START GAME]
[SCREEN 2]
You now see the first screen of the experiment on your computer. It should look
similar to this screen.
At the top left of the screen, you see your subject ID. Please record that on your
record sheet now. You have been randomly matched by the computer with exactly one of
the other participants. This pair assignment will change after each match.
You have been assigned your strength for this match, which is revealed to you on
your screen. [point on overhead]. Your exact strength number on your own screen would
probably be diﬀerent from the one on this slide.
The participant you are matched with was also randomly assigned a strength, but
that will not be revealed to you until the end of the match. All you know now is that their
strength is some number between 1 and 100, with every number being equally likely.
There are two buttons, one marked “Fight” and one marked “Retreat”. You must
choose one of those two buttons, but please do not do so yet. I want to remind you how
your payoﬀs will be computed. If you and the person you are matched with BOTH choose
retreat, then each of you receives a 40 points payoﬀ. If either one of you chooses fight, then
whoever has the higher strength receives 95 points and whoever has the lower strength
receives 5 points. If you have the same strength, then the computer will randomly choose
one of you to receive 95 points and the other to receive 5 points.
At this time, if your subject ID is even, please click on the button labelled “fight”. If
your subject ID is odd, please click on the button labelled “retreat”.
When everyone has made a choice, you are told the choice made by the participant you
are matched with and also told that participant’s strength. The outcome is summarized
on your screen. [show on overhead screen]
[SCREEN 3]
Each Round Summary is shown on the center of the screen.
The bottom half of your screen contains a table summarizing the results for all matches
you have participated in. This is called your history screen. It will be filled out as the
experiment proceeds. Notice that it only shows the results from your pair, not the results
from any of the other pairs. PLEASE record this information on your record sheet.
We now proceed to the next match.
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For the next match you will be randomly re-matched into pairs, and randomly receive
new strength assignments.
[START next MATCH]
Please notice your new strength assignment. [Reader: Ask if everyone sees it, and
wait for confirmation from them.] Please make the opposite decision in match 2 than you
made in match 1. That is, if your subject ID is even please click on the retreat button
and if your subject ID is odd, please click on the “fight” button, and then wait for further
instructions.
[wait for them to complete match 2]
Practice match 2 is now over.
Please complete the review questions before we begin the paid session. Once you
answer all the questions correctly, click submit. After both participants in your pair have
answered the first round of questions, the next round of questions will appear. Please
answer all questions correctly and click submit and the quiz will disappear from your
screen. [WAIT for everyone to finish the Quiz]
Are there any questions before we begin with the paid session? We will now begin
with the 20 paid matches of Part 1. Please pull out your dividers for the paid session of
the experiment. If there are any problems or questions from this point on, raise your hand
and an experimenter will come and assist you.
[START MATCH 2]
[After MATCH 21 read:]
We have now reached the end of Part 1. Your total payoﬀ from this part is displayed
on your screen. Please record this on your record sheet and CLICK OK. We will now give
you instructions for Part 2. Please listen carefully.
Part 2
Part 2 of the experiment will take place over a sequence of 2 practice and 20 paid
matches. This Part is almost exactly the same as Part 1, with one diﬀerence. For each
pair, one of the participants will choose to retreat or fight before the other participant
makes a choice. The other participant will then be told the first participant’s decision and
will then make their decision in response. Payoﬀs are computed exactly as before. For
each match, the computer randomly selects the participant to decide first, so sometimes
you will decide first and sometimes you will decide second. The assignment of who decides
first or second does not in any way depend on the strength assignment or past decisions.
The computer program just randomly assigns one participant for each pair to decide first.
We will now proceed through two practice matches to familiarize you with the screens,
which are slightly diﬀerent than Part 1.
[Go to Match 22]
You now see the first screen of the experiment on your computer.
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In this part of the experiment, the computer randomly assigns an order in which the
two members of your pair make decisions. If you are assigned as the first decision maker
in your match, your screen should look similar to this:
[SCREEN 4]
[Describe the screen by pointing and READ THE SCREEN]
Of course your exact strength number on your own screen would probably be diﬀerent
from the one on this overhead.
If you are assigned as the second decision maker in your match, your screen looks like
this:
[SCREEN 5]
[Describe the screen by pointing and READ THE SCREEN]
Of course your exact strength number on your own screen would probably be diﬀerent
from the one on this overhead.
The first decision maker in each pair must make a decision. If you are decision maker
one and your ID is even please click on the Fight button now. If you are decision maker
one and your ID is odd please click on the Retreat button now. If you are decision maker
two, please wait until it is your turn to make a decision.
Next, the first decision maker’s choice is revealed to the second decision maker. Please
do not make any decisions until I finish explaining. The screen looks like:
[SCREEN 6] if decision maker one chose fight, READ the SCREEN
[SCREEN 7] if decision maker one chose retreat READ the SCREEN
After viewing this information, the second decision maker is prompted to a choice.
If decision maker one chose Fight, then the outcome does not depend on decision maker
two’s choice. In this case we simply ask decision maker two to click on the “continue”
button. If decision maker one chose retreat, then the outcome does depend on decision
maker two’s choice, so decision maker two must now make a choice of fight or retreat.
This information is summarized on this slide
[SCREEN 8]
If you are decision maker two and you have a choice, if your ID is even, please click
the Retreat button now. If your ID is odd, please click on Fight now. Otherwise, please
click on the continue button now. This is important so please do not forget to do so. The
match cannot proceed until the second decision maker has clicked a button.
The results of the match are then displayed for both decision makers in the pair. The
screen should look like:
[SCREEN 9] for first decision maker
[SCREEN 10] and like this for second decision maker
We will now proceed to the second practice match [CLICK NEXT MATCH]. When
you are prompted to make a decision, please make the opposite decision from your decision
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in the first practice match. That is, if your ID is even, click on Retreat, and if your ID
is odd, click on Fight. Please go ahead and make your choices. If you are decision maker
two and you see the continue button, please remember to click on it or it will delay the
experiment.
[Advance to match 23 and wait for participants to finish]
The practice match is now over. Are there any questions before we begin the 20 paid
matches?
[SCREEN 11] Here is a summary of the Payoﬀ
[START MATCH 24]
[After MATCH 44, read:]
Your Total Payoﬀ for both parts is displayed on your screen. Please record this payoﬀ
on your record sheet and remember to CLICK OK after you are done.
[CLICK ON WRITE OUTPUT]
Your total payoﬀ is this amount plus the show-up fee of $10. We will pay each of you
in private in the next room in the order of your Subject ID number. Remember you are
under no obligation to reveal your earnings to the other players.
Please put the mouse behind the computer and do not use either the mouse or the
keyboard at all. Please remain seated and keep the dividers pulled out until we call you
to be paid. Do not converse with the other participants or use your cell phone while in
the laboratory.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Could the person with ID number 0 go to the next room to be paid.
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Figure 2.  Distribution of cutpoints, by condition.
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